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Abstract
We study a model where individuals choose both the level of provision of a public
good and the quota of low-skilled immigrants that are allowed into the country. In-
dividuals can supplement the public good in the private market. Immigrants a¤ect
natives through three channels: (i) the labor market; (ii) tax collection; (iii) the qual-
ity of the public good. We nd that the higher the political weight of the rich (highly
skilled) is, the less tolerant the poor and the middle-class are toward immigration and
the more demanding they are toward increasing public spending. The rich are the most
favorable to immigration. As they have more weight, the political outcome is closer to
their preferences and further from the preferences of the other groups. We use data
from the European Social Survey to test the implications of our model.
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1 Introduction
Several socioeconomic factors determine native attitudes toward immigrants and hence to-
ward immigration policies. Native workers can be reluctant to receive more immigrants due
to concerns about labor market competition from foreigners.1 Another economic issue is
whether immigration causes an increased tax burden on natives. That is, whether immi-
grants are net beneciaries of the welfare system (Kerr and Kerr, 2011). It is this impact
that has raised recently a great deal of concern regarding immigration in several European
countries, particularly due to the economic crisis.2 On top of these traditional factors that
work through the labor market and the welfare state, it is also important to consider how
the political process a¤ects public opinion about immigrants. Political competition leads
politicians to implement immigration policies that satisfy the interest of a majority, which
in turn may foster hostile attitudes toward foreigners among those in a minority. That is, we
claim that a great deal of variation in attitudes toward immigration is left unexplained by the
aforementioned traditional factors. Two identical individuals (in observable characteristics)
may have very di¤erent attitudes toward immigration simply because they live in regions
with di¤erent types of political majorities.
The aim of this paper is to assess, theoretically and empirically, to what extent labor-
market concerns, welfare state considerations, and political competition drive native atti-
tudes toward immigration. We develop and test a model in which the interplay between
immigration process, labor-market concerns, and welfare-state considerations determine the
shape of native preferences regarding immigration and social (tax-expenditure) policies. Our
model embeds the political economy model of public provision of private goods developed
by Epple and Romano (1996) into a setting where agents also decide on immigration quotas.
We consider three groups of natives who di¤er in their skill levels (low-, medium-, and highly
skilled) and their political preferences. Natives rst decide how much to supplement a public
good by private purchases and, second, they choose by majority vote an immigration policy
1See Blau and Kahn (2012) for a recent survey on the impact of immigration on income distribution.
2In fact, it is the perception by natives, not the true e¤ect, what matters. For example, Cunningham
(2006) demonstrates that, contrary to popular perceptions, communities in the US with high use of emergency
departments have fewer immigrants.
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and a tax-expenditure policy. To obtain a voting equilibrium we use a version of the proba-
bilistic voting model by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).3 We use this model as it guarantees
the existence of a political equilibrium in multi-dimensional models. It is particularly useful
when citizens can be partitioned into di¤erent groups, as is our case.
An interesting implication of our model is as follows. We nd that low- and medium-
skilled natives living in countries where the highly skilled group is larger than the other two
groups are: (i) more willing to restrict immigration and (ii) more willing to raise taxes and
spending, compared to low- and medium-skilled natives living in countries where the highly
skilled is not larger than the other groups. In other words, we nd greater polarization of
opinions on immigration in those countries in which the highly skilled group dominates. The
intuition is simple. Where the rich are decisive, the political outcome is close to their bliss
point. That is, a high immigration quota and a low level of public good provision. Yet
this political outcome is far away from the bliss point of the other two groups, compared to
countries in which the highly skilled are not decisive.
To test these implications we use data from the 2008 wave of the European Social Survey
(ESS).4 The ESS contains several questions in which individuals express their attitudes
toward immigrants, together with many other individual and socioeconomic data. There is
also information on attitudes toward public expenditure. Individuals answer whether or not
they are willing to raise spending and taxes.5 We use the education levels of individuals
as a proxy for skill. Individuals with higher education will be the highly skilled (the rich),
individuals with at most secondary education will be the middle-skilled, and individuals with
at most primary education will be the low-skilled. We compute the fractions that the three
groups represent in each country, identifying the countries in which the highly skilled have
a higher weight than the other two groups.
We want to explain individual preferences regarding both immigration and public spend-
ing. In fact, we claim that these preferences are jointly determined. The natural alternative
3See also Persson and Tabellini (2000).
4ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data (2008). Data le edition 4.1. Norwegian Social
Science Data Services, Norway Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.
5The reason for using only the 2008 wave is that in the other waves individuals are not asked about their
attitudes regarding public expenditure.
3
is, therefore, to use a model in which this is explicitly taken into account. Since both vari-
ables of interest are dummy variables, we estimate a bivariate Probit model. In line with
the previous literature we nd evidence in favor of the labor market and the welfare state
hypothesis. But we also nd some evidence in favor of the political processchannel. In
particular, after tting the model we calculate for each educational group average attitudes
toward immigration and spending, but di¤erentiating between whether those individuals live
in a country where the highly skilled group is larger than the others groups or not. At this
stage we have controlled for a number of observable characteristics, as well as for regional
dummy variables.6
With respect to the attitude toward immigration our empirical evidence is in line with
our theoretical prediction for both middle-skilled and highly skilled individuals, although
not for the low-skilled. Consider rst middle-skilled individuals. Among those who live in
countries where the highly skilled are a majority, a 41% of them are favorable to immigration,
compared to a 47% among those who live where the highly skilled are not a majority. For
the highly skilled, di¤erences are much bigger since the corresponding percentages are 45%
and 65%. On the contrary, low-skilled individuals seem less favorable to immigration in
countries where the highly skilled are not a majority (29%) that where they are a majority
(36%).7 With respect to the attitude toward public spending the evidence is in line with
our theoretical predictions for the three groups. Among the low-skilled, we nd that they
are more willing to support an increase in spending if they live in a high-skilled country
(43%) than if they live in a country where the highly skilled are not a majority (36%). For
the middle-skilled, the corresponding numbers are 34% and 30%, while for the highly skilled
they are 36% and 34%.8
Ortega (2010) develops a theoretical model to analyze the political sustainability of the
welfare state. In his model agents choose redistribution and immigration policy by majority
vote. He shows that unskilled voters use unskilled immigration policy as a device that allows
6Regions are dened at the NUTS-1 level and the dummy variables aim to control for the average di¤er-
ences across regions in any unobservable characteristics.
7Di¤erences are statistically signicant for the three groups, at least at the 1% level of signicance.
8Regarding opinions about public spending, di¤erences are statistically signicant for low- and middle-
skilled groups (p-value < 0.01 in both cases). For the high-skilled, the di¤erence is not statistically signicant
(p-value is 0.273).
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them to guarantee a higher degree of redistribution in the future. Llavador and Solano-
García (2011) present a political economic model in which labor-market concerns together
with non-economic factors, e.g., cultural and security concerns, shape native attitudes toward
immigrants.9 Our paper expands this literature by looking at the integrated predictions of
both the size of the welfare state and the size of the immigration quota. Even though in
our theoretical model we do not consider non-economic factors, this dimension can easily be
incorporated. In that case voters would be characterized by two non-economic components:
their intrinsic attitude toward immigrants and their political preferences. Since, by as-
sumption, these dimensions are orthogonal to economic policy platforms, political candidates
in equilibrium would still try to satisfy groups with a higher number of swing voters.10
Our paper also relates to the extensive empirical literature on immigration. The works
of Dustman and Preston (2006, 2007) and Facchini and Mayda (2009) are of particular in-
terest.11 Dustman and Preston (2007) estimate an structural model which considers three
di¤erent channels that may shape individuals attitudes toward immigration, labor market
and welfare state concerns, and cultural and racial prejudices. Regarding the second channel,
they implicitly assume that the welfare state adjusts to immigration through changes in the
tax rate keeping per capita benets constant. They nd that for British highly-educated
people, welfare concern is the most important channel through which their preferences re-
garding further immigration seem to be shaped. They also nd that racial factors play an
important role among the lower educated. Facchini and Mayda (2009) develop and test a
theoretical model in which labor market and welfare state considerations interact with each
other to form public opinion about immigration. They consider a xed exogenously given
welfare system which automatically adjusts to the arrival of immigrants either by increasing
the tax rate to keep per capita expenditure constant or by reducing per capita benets, keep-
ing the tax-rate constant. They show that attitudes toward immigration are heterogeneous
9Benhabib (1996) and Roemer and Van der Straeten (2006) also apply a political economic approach
to study how immigration policies are determined. Benhabib develops a model in which the supply of
immigrants is xed and immigrants are heterogeneous in capital endowment. Roemer and Van der Straeten
consider a model where voterspreferences regarding immigration and economic policies are exogenous.
10In our empirical part, though, we control for non-economic factor as drivers of opinions.
11See also Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006), Hanson et al. (2009) and Ortega and Polavieja
(2012).
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across native population and that they depend on how the welfare system adjusts to the rise
of the population size.
Our theoretical model shows that the arrival of immigrants rst causes distributional
e¤ects (the labor market hypotheses) and then changes native preferences regarding tax-
expenditure policies, suggesting that determinants of public opinion about immigration and
the welfare system should be jointly estimated. One downside of the previous empirical
literature is that the joint determination of preferences regarding taxes and immigration
policies is typically ignored. Hence existing estimations may not capture the full extent
of the e¤ect of the welfare state channel on individual attitudes toward immigrants and
the reported estimations can be biased. The current paper contributes to the empirical
literature in two respects. First, our empirical illustration takes explicitly into account that
preferences regarding tax-expenditure policy and immigration policy are jointly determined.
Thus we provide more precise estimations of the e¤ects that the labor market and the welfare
state channels have on native attitudes toward immigration. Second, we provide empirical
evidence for the European countries covered in the ESS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 describes the economic environment
and the political process. In Section 3 we characterize individual private decisions and Section
4 looks for political equilibrium outcomes. In Section 5, we present our empirical illustration.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Population and technology
Total working age population is composed of three groups: highly skilled individuals, i.e.,
those with a college degree, medium-skilled workers, i.e., those who completed secondary
education but did not attend college, and low-skilled workers, who are those who dropped
out from high school.12 Let NJ represent the number of type J workers, with J = H;M;L.
12We choose a model with three types of individuals instead of a simpler model with two types for two
reasons. First, a theoretical model with two types of individuals (the poor and the rich) implicitly assumes
that the interests of the poor are aligned with those of the middle-class, which is not necessarily true as we
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The total number of natives is xed and it is equal to N = NH + NM + NL. Later on,
natives will decide how many (low-skilled) immigrants are allowed in. In most developed
countries, the arrival of immigrants with low skills is an issue in the sense that there is a
heated debate over the social and economic e¤ects that this type of immigration can have. In
this paper, we abstract from high skilled immigration since we want to study to what extent
the perceptions of these e¤ects drive nativesattitudes toward low-skilled immigrants.13 We
call I the number of immigrants that are allowed to enter the country, with I 2 [0; I]. Total
population will be, therefore, P = N + I:
There are three production factors, corresponding to the three types of labor, and every-
body works the same xed number of hours during their lifetime. Labor supply is denoted
by LH , LM , and LL for high-, medium-, and low-skilled workers, respectively. Following
Johnson (1984) we assume a linear homogeneous production function of the three types of
labor y = F (LH ; LM ; LL) ; where @F@LJ > 0 and
@2F
@L2J
< 0 for J = H;M;L. Markets are
assumed to be competitive and, therefore, the equilibrium wage of factor J is wJ = @F@LJ . By
homogeneity of F; total labor income
P
J=H;M;LwJLJ ; equals total output y. Highly skilled
workers are complementary to both medium- and low-skilled workers, while medium- and
low-skilled workers are perfect substitutes of each other. We also assume that the former
are more productive than the latter because of their higher level of education. We rewrite
the production function as y = f (LH ; G), where G = bLM + LL, and b  1. Then, we have
wM = bwL:
Our technology implies that a rise in the number of low-skilled workers due, for example,
to the inow of immigrants, leads to a rise in the wage of highly skilled workers and to a
fall in the wages of both medium- and low-skilled workers.14 Note nally that the arrival
will show in Section 4. Second, in our empirical exercise we would have to assume that parameters capturing
individualsattitudes toward policy issues do not vary between individuals who drop out from high school
(the poor) and individuals who completed secondary education (the middle-class), even though they may
have di¤erent interests.
13In an extension of the model we study the problem of deciding on the skill composition of an immigration
ow. See Appendix 2.
14There is some controversy in the literature on whether immigrants and natives in the same skill category
are perfect substitutes or not. Aydemir and Borjas (2007) and Borjas et al. (2008, 2010) claim that they are
perfect substitutes. Card (2009), Ottaviano and Peri (2012), DAmuri et al. (2010), and Manacorda et al.
(2012) argue that they are not perfect substitutes, although they obtain very large elasticities. In contrast,
Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2012), using the same database as Ottaviano and Peri (2012) conclude that
the two groups are perfect substitutes. See also Bratsberg et al. (2014) for an overview on the literature and
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of immigrants is always positive for the country as a whole, since total output y increases
monotonically with LL:
2.2 Policy instruments and individual preferences
The government collects tax revenue R = y; where  is the tax rate. Taxes are used to
nance public services, which are produced using a numeraire commodity with a constant
returns to scale technology. One unit of the publicly provided service is produced by using p
units of the numeraire. To save notation, we normalize p = 1: Here we will refer to public ser-
vices as health services, although the analysis applies also to other goods or services that can
be supplemented with private purchases such as education, law enforcement, transportation,
etc.15
Individuals have preferences represented by the utility function U(c; h); where h rep-
resents health services and c is a composite good, to which we will refer as consumption.
We assume that U(c; h) is quasi-concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable over (c; h).
In addition, we make the standard assumptions that both c and h are normal goods and
that the utility function is such that limc!0 U(c; h) =  1 and limh!0 U(c; h) =  1. This
guarantees that individuals prefer any pair (c; h) >> 0 to both (c; 0) or (0; h).
Government provides health services with quality q; the same for all individuals. In par-
ticular we propose q = R=P ; where P = N + I is total population, and   0 is a parameter
that captures congestion e¤ects. This parametrization was used rst by Borcherding and
Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).16 The case  = 0 corresponds to a
pure public good where quality is completely independent of population and coincides with
expenditure R. When  = 1; quality is exactly per capita expenditure. The higher the
parameter  is, the more congested is the public good. We will focus on the case in which
 > 0, excluding the case of a pure public good.
Individuals can supplement public health services by purchasing additional health services
additional evidence with Norwegian data.
15Our model relates to the works of Coen-Pirani (2011) and Tanaka et al. (2014) that apply a political
economy approach to study the e¤ects of immigration on public spending on basic education. Considering
an opting-out version of school-choice model, they nd a negative relationship between these variables.
16See also Reiter and Weichenrieder (1999).
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in the private market. We call s the amount of health services privately purchased. The cost
of one unit of private health service is one unit of the numeraire. That is, we assume that
there are no di¤erences in productivity between the public and the private sector, and also
that markets are competitive in the sense that private health suppliers are price-takers. The
total amount of health services consumed by an individual of type J is, therefore, hJ = q+sJ .
The rst part (q) is common to all individuals and the second part (sJ) is group-specic.
2.3 Individual voting behavior
Natives vote on candidates (parties), A and B, whose electoral platforms specify values
for the policy instruments. Let ek represent the policy platform of candidate k, with k =
A;B. In particular, ek = ( k; qk; Ik): The rst and second components are the economic
policy instruments and the third component describes the immigration policy. Since qk is
completely determined by  k and Ik; we write ek = ( k; Ik). Candidates can make binding
promises on both policy instruments. Following Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), we assume
there is another dimension that is relevant for voters in which candidates cannot make
binding promises. Some authors call this additional dimension ideology, but this is just one
possible interpretation. This ideological dimension is orthogonal to the policy platform ek
and cannot be modied during the electoral campaign. In addition, we assume that voters
within skill groups di¤er in their evaluation of this ideology dimension. Then, the policy
platform together with candidate ideology determines voter decisions.
Consider an individual i with skill level J . Let WJ(e) denote is indirect utility function,
which we will explain in detail in Section 4. As a voter, i prefers candidate A if:
WJ(eA) > WJ(eB) + i;J + ; (1)
where i;J is an individual parameter that measures voter i ideological bias toward candidate
B. When i;J = 0; individual i only cares about economic policy. When i;J > 0; she has
a bias in favor of candidate B. We assume that i;J follows a uniform distribution on
[  1
2J
; 1
2J
]; with density J . On the other hand, the parameter  measures the average
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popularity of candidate B in the whole population. This parameter also follows a uniform
distribution on [  1
2'
; 1
2'
], with density '.
Parameter J measures how sensitive individuals in group J are to economic policy.
When it is high, they are more concerned about economic and immigration policy than
about ideological issues.
2.4 Timing of the model
The timing of events is as follows: (1) foresighted individuals decide the amount of private
health care supplement s and the amount of private consumption c, taken as given a policy
vector e = ( ; I). (2) The two candidates announce their policy platforms simultaneously:
eA and eB. At this stage, both candidates are acquainted with voter policy preferences,
the distributions of i;J , and , but not yet their realized values. (3) The value of the
parameter  is revealed. (4) The election takes place, and the elected candidate implements
her announced policy platform.
3 Individual private choices
In Stage 1 individuals choose s; taking into account their expectations regarding the equi-
librium policy vector e = ( ; I). The utility of a type-J individual is U(cJ ; hJ); where
cJ = (1  )wJ(I)  sJ , hJ = q+ sJ ; and hJ  q: The necessary and su¢ cient condition that
determines sJ is:
MRS(cJ ; hJ) =  Uc(cJ ; hJ)=Uh(cJ ; hJ)   1 (=  1 if sJ > 0): (2)
Figure 1 illustrates an example of the optimal choice of the rich and the poor type, respec-
tively. Budget sets are represented with bold lines. The slope of the budget lines is -1.
In this example we assume homothetic preferences and, therefore, the slope of indi¤erence
curves is constant along the ray denoted by H. The rich type chooses point R, where the
condition holds with equality, MRS(cH ; hH) =  1: They choose to purchase health services
sH > 0 in the private market.
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Regarding the poor, if possible they would like to choose point U; with sL < 0: Being this
unfeasible, they choose point P; a corner solution, where sL = 0: At the optimal solution
(P ) the MRS is steeper than at point U; MRS(cL; hL) <  1:
Figure 1
Let hJ((1   )wJ(I); q) denote the demand function for health care services of an indi-
vidual of type J , when the government provides quality q:17 Recall that, for xed values of 
and I; the value of q is xed as well. Now, for a given value of I; since quality q is an strictly
increasing function of  ; for each group J we can nd a threshold value bJ such that sJ > 0
when  < bJ ; while sJ = 0 when   bJ . This threshold value bJ is the one that solves
hJ((1  bJ)wJ(I); q(bJ)) = q(bJ): The fact that both c and h are normal goods implies thatbL  bM  bH : Another implication of normality is that, for any given value of  ; we get
sL  sM  sH .
For a given value of I; there are three possible regimes according to the value of  : i)
Government-only provision (GO) corresponds to   bH ; since in this case the quality q
provided by the government is so high that even the rich do not supplement in the private
market (sL = sM = sH = 0); ii) All-Market (AM ) is the case when   bL; and quality q is
so low that the three groups decide to supplement in the private market (sL > 0); iii) Mixed
system (GM ), when  2 (bL;bH) the poor use only public health services, i.e., sL = 0, and
the rich always supplement with private purchases, sH > 0. This third case corresponds to
the situation depicted in Figure 1.
4 Political equilibrium and comparative static analysis
We start by deriving individual preferences regarding policy platforms. Next, we characterize
the political equilibrium outcome. Finally, we derive some comparative statics results with
respect to individual attitudes toward economic and immigration policies.
17This is similar to Epple and Romano (1996).
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4.1 Individual preferences regarding policy instruments
To formally study candidate policy announcements at Stage 2, we rst compute individual
preferences regarding policy platforms. Consider a type-J individual. Let eJ = (J ; IJ)
denote her bliss point, which is the solution ofWJ(e) = maxf;Ig
fU((1  )wJ(I)  sJ ; q + sJ))g,
subject to the restrictions that 0    1 and 0  I  I: Since the utility function is
continuous and the parameter space is a compact set, there is always a solution to this
maximization problem. In addition, let J() and J(I) denote individual Js marginal
utilities. Then, the rst-order conditions are:
J() = MRS(cJ ; hJ)wJ(I) +
@q
@
 0; (= 0 if  > 0); (3)
J(I) =  MRS(cJ ; hJ)(1  )
@wJ
@I
+
@q
@I
S 0; (= 0 if I 2 (0; I)): (4)
We begin by studying Equation (3), where we take I as given. We can rule out a corner
solution with  = 1 by our assumptions on the utility function. A tax increase reduces
individual Js disposable income, which entails a utility loss. The rst term in Equation
(3) captures this marginal cost. On the other hand, the tax increase allows for a higher
provision of the public service, which in turns increases utility. The second term in Equation
(3) captures this marginal benet.
Let J denote the optimal choice of group J . The following proposition ranks the pre-
ferred tax rates. The crucial parameter turns out to be ; the one that measures congestion
in the public good. The higher is , the more expensive health public provision will be, and
hence the more likely that all individuals will want to supplement. This corresponds to the
All-market regime (AM). Here, we focus on a conguration in which the degree of congestion
is intermediate.
Proposition 1 (Ranking of tax rates) We denote by U0J the indirect utility function
subject to the constraint that sJ = 0. Suppose that wM < y=P  < wH and assume that the
slope of the function U0J = maxf;qg
fU((1   )wJ ; q)g in the space (q; ) is lower for group M
than for group L. Then, H = 0 < L < M < 1, with L 2 [^L; 1) and M 2 [^M ; 1).
Proof. See Appendix 1
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The condition on the slope of the function U0J is called Slope Rising in Income (SRI)
in Epple and Romano (1996).18 This condition says that, for a given increase in quality q;
group M is willing to accept a higher increase in the tax rate than group L. According to
Epple and Romano, empirical evidence seems to support SRI for health services.19
If wL < y=P  < wM ; the only change with respect to Proposition 1 is that now M = 0:
Note also that the condition in Proposition 1 will hold whenever  is close to one, provided
that the median wage is wM : The reason is that, when  = 1; y=P  is just mean income. In
most empirical wage distributions, the median wage is lower than the mean wage. Then, we
have exactly the conguration in the proposition.
We next use Expression (4) to discuss the di¤erent e¤ects of the number of immigrants
I on utility. A marginal increase in the number of low-skilled immigrants a¤ects type-Js
welfare through two di¤erent channels: (i) the labor market, and (ii) the quality of the public
service. The labor market channel is captured by the term (1  )@wJ
@I
, which is positive for
highly skilled individuals, and negative for both medium- and low-skilled individuals.
With respect to the quality of the public service, the arrival of low-skilled immigrants
a¤ects the quality of public health services by an amount @q
@I
, which is common for all three
groups and it is equal to:
@q
@I
= 

@y(I)
@I
1
P 
   y(I)
P 1+

: (5)
The rst term reects the fact that the arrival of immigrants increases the number of tax-
payers and, therefore, tax revenue goes up. However, the arrival of immigrants increases the
size of the population, and hence the number of users of the public service. Therefore, for a
given amount of public expenditure, the inow of immigrants reduces q by an amount  y
P 1+
.
This is the congestion e¤ect. The nal e¤ect on q will depend on which one of these two
e¤ects prevails. The resulting net e¤ect is what we call net-tax-base e¤ect.20
18The di¤erence with our case is that they dene preferences on ( ; q); rather than in (q; ):
19Suppose the utility function has a CES form as U(cJ ; hJ) = (a(cJ)r+(1 a)(hJ)r)1=r; with r  1: Then
SRI holds if and only if r < 0; that is, when the two goods are complements. When r > 0; the two goods
are substitutes and we get M < L: Finally, when r = 0 (Cobb-Douglas case) both groups choose exactly
the same tax rate, L = M .
20If we dene as I =
@y
@I
NL+I
y the output elasticity of I; we see that
@q
@I  0 if and only if   I PNL+I :
That is, when congestion e¤ects are strong enough, an increase in the number of immigrants will always be
detrimental for the quality of public health services q:
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The following proposition ranks individual preferences regarding immigration policies
according to their types.
Proposition 2 (Preferences on immigration policy) Suppose that wM < y=P  < wH :
Then, optimal values of I for the three groups satisfy 0  IL = IM < IH  I:
Proof. See Appendix 1
4.2 Political equilibrium outcome
We now characterize economic and immigration policies that arise as equilibrium in the
political process. Individuals vote for those policy platforms that are as close as possible to
their bliss point. To study candidate decisions we have to identify the swing voter in each
group J: This is the individual who is exactly indi¤erent between the platforms of candidates
A and B, i.e.:
J = WJ(eA) WJ(eB)  : (6)
Expression (6) implies that those individuals in group J with i;J  J will vote for candidate
A. Up to this point  is still unknown and, therefore, the identityof the swing voters, and
hence, the electoral outcome are random variables related to the realization of .
Candidates A and B commit to policies eA and eB so as to maximize their probabilities
of winning, A and B = 1   A, respectively. Because the candidates face the same
optimization problem, and A and B are smooth functions of the policy platforms (see
Proof of Proposition 3 below), there exists a Nash equilibrium that has both A and B
converging to the same policy announcement: eA = eB = e?.21 Hereafter, e denotes the
policy platform that arises as a political equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3 (Political Equilibrium) Suppose that wM < y=P  < wH and that SRI
holds. Then, at the political equilibrium outcome ( ; I) we have that: 0 = H     M <
1 and 0  IL = IM  I  IH  I.
Proof. See Appendix 1
21See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a detailed discussion of this voting
model.
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4.3 Comparative statics analysis
Turnout rates vary across socioeconomic groups. Di¤erences in these rates may make some
groups more attractive in terms of votes than others, and hence more inuential. The
parameters Js capture these di¤erences across groups H, M and L. Precisely, we want
to study what is the e¤ect on policy announcements when the highly skilled group becomes
more inuential, and its consequences on low- and medium-skilled groupsattitudes toward
immigration and economic policies. In terms of our model, this amounts to study what
happens if the parameter H increases (keeping M and L xed).
Assumption 1 Candidate As probability of winning is such that @
2A
@@I
 0.
The cross derivative @
2A
@@I
describes to what extent tax-expenditure and immigration
policies are jointly determined. The higher its absolute value is, the stronger is the link
between  and I. In particular, when @
2A
@@I
= 0 the equilibrium level   does not depend
on the immigration quota I. This is implicitly assumed by most of the existing empirical
literature.22 The fact that @
2A
@@I
 0 means that the marginal e¤ect of  on A decreases with
I. The intuition is the following. Consider the case in which @A
@
is positive. An increase in  ,
all other things being constant, increases the quality of the public health service. Candidate
A gets some additional votes from those who are willing to support a marginal tax increase,
hence A increases. Assumption 1 says that, when the immigration quota I is high, the
congestion e¤ect gets worse decreasing q, which reduces the marginal increase in the number
of votes.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, an increase in H , ceteris paribus,
decreases  and increases I at the equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 1
This proposition shows that policy instruments  and I are, respectively, non-increasing
and non-decreasing functions of the parameter H . This is because as H rises, the skilled
22Preferences represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function correspond to this case.
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population becomes more protable in terms of votes, and politicians tilt their announce-
ments toward highly skilled individualsbliss point, making the low- and medium-skilled
individuals less tolerant to the arrival of immigrants.
Corollary 1 Suppose that wM < y=P  < wH and that SRI holds. If H increases, both
the low- and the medium-skilled individuals are less tolerant to the arrival of immigrants.
Moreover, the medium-skilled are also more willing to rise tax-expenditure policies.
The e¤ect of an increase in H on the tax-expenditure preferences of the low-skilled is
ambiguous. We know that at the equilibrium,   is between H and M : As 
H increases,
  moves towards H : But, under SRI we know that L is between H and M as well (see
Proposition 1). So, it could be that now   gets closer to the bliss point of the low-skilled.
Corollary 1 also describes what happens with the rich groups attitude when her political
inuence shrinks. In that case, political competition leads to a rise in the tax rate and to a
tighter immigration policy, making the rich more willing to reduce public expenditure and
more favorable to increasing the immigration quota.
5 Empirical Illustration
We derive some testable implications from our theoretical model. First, in Section 4.1 we
obtained the preferred policies for the three skill groups. In particular, propositions 1 and 2
provide a partial characterization of policy preferences regarding immigration. Second, we
obtain an equilibrium conguration in Proposition 3. However, we cannot test these results
without precise data on the implemented policies. Fortunately, we can do so indirectly by
using the results of Corollary 1. This is what we explore next.
5.1 Data and descriptive results
We use data from the 4th wave (2008) of the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a
social survey that gathers information on attitudes and beliefs of individuals from several
European countries.23 In the 2008 wave, 29 countries were covered with a total of 56,752
23See http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
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observations.24 Since we are interested in studying individual opinions about immigration we
exclude four countries that have a fraction of foreign population below 1%.25 We eliminate
individuals aged under 18 or over 100 (1,736 observations), and a few individuals who do
not report their educational level (92 observations). We nally drop all individuals who are
not citizens of the country in which they live (2,059 observations), since we are interested in
the opinions of those who can vote. This reduces our sample to 46,870 individuals from 26
countries.
5.1.1 Measuring Attitudes toward Immigrants
There are several questions about immigration in the ESS. In particular, participants are
asked their opinion about immigrants of the same ethnic group as the majority in the host
country, about immigrants of a di¤erent ethnic group, and about immigrants from poorer
countries outside Europe. For instance, one of questions is (variable impcntr):
To what extent (country) should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe to
come and live here?
The four possible answers are: allow many to come and live here (1), allow some (2),
allow a few (3), or allow none (4). The other two questions are imsmetn and imdfetn,
where people answer about their willingness to allow immigrants of the same ethnic group or
from di¤erent ethnic groups as the majority of the country, respectively.26 We focus on the
variable impcntr since we believe it is the one that captures better opinions on low-skilled
immigration. We build a dummy variable called proimm that takes value 1 when the variable
impcntr takes value 1 or 2, and it is zero otherwise. The mean of proimm is .441 (standard
deviation is .497).27
Our rst observation is that there is a great deal of heterogeneity across countries with
24The list of countries is: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Turkey.
25These are Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania, with a total of 5,995 observations.
26There are others questions related to immigrantsrights and the impact immigrants have on the countrys
economy, culture and welfare state.
27We could alternatively construct a variable that takes value 1 only when both imdfetn and impcntr take
value 1 or 2. This would be very similar to the one we use, with a mean value of .359 (standard deviation
.479).
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respect to attitudes toward immigration as measured by our variable proimm. Figure 2 plots
country means of proimm. The dotted line is the overall mean. The highest value is in
Sweden (87%) and the lowest in Cyprus (7%).
Figure 2
We next relate individual attitudes toward immigration with the economic status of indi-
viduals. We classify them into three groups, according to their educational attainment:
individuals with low, middle and high education. Later, we use this classication to test
the political process predictions of the model. By using the International Standard Classi-
cation of Education (ISCED), individuals are classied into ve groups: (i) less than lower
secondary education (ISCED 0-1); (ii) lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2); (iii)
upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3); (iv) post-secondary non-tertiary education
(ISCED 4); (v) tertiary education completed (ISCED 5). Relative frequencies are 15.9%,
13.2%, 32.6%, 3.0%, and 35.3%. We consider group (i) as the low-skilled group, (ii) and
(iii) as the medium-skilled, and groups (iv) and (v) as highly skilled. Figure 3 represents
the fraction of individuals with a positive attitude by educational level. There are striking
di¤erences across education levels. The percentage of individuals who favor immigration
goes from 30% among the low-skilled to 43% and 51% among the medium and the highly
skilled, respectively.28
Figure 3
To test the predictions on individualspreferences on immigration and welfare-state poli-
cies, we use data on household income, precisely the hincfel variable in the sample. Individu-
als are asked how they feel about household income. Possible answers are: living comfortably
on present income (1); coping on present income (2); di¢ cult on present income (3); or very
di¢ cult on present income (4). Sample frequencies are 20.72%, 42.89%, 25.48%, and 10.92%.
We build a dummy variable, called lowincome, that takes value 1 when hincfel is either 3
or 4. Using this variable, we nd that the mean value of proimm is 35.6% for low-income
28We nd a similar educational gradient if we represent the mean values of the two other questions on
immigration (imsmetn and imdfetn).
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individuals (lowincome=1) and it is 48.7% for the rest of individuals.
Another indirect measure of income is captured by the brwmny variable. Individuals are
asked whether they nd di¢ cult to borrow money to make ends meet. Possible answers are:
very di¢ cult (1); quite di¢ cult (2); neither easy nor di¢ cult (3); quite easy (4); very easy
(5). We build a dummy variable called borrowconstrained that takes value 1 when brwmny
is either 1 or 2. The mean of proimm is 40.3% for individuals who have problems to borrow
money (borrowconstrained=1) and it is 48.5% for the rest.29
5.1.2 Measuring Attitudes toward Public Spending
In our model voters decide also how much to spend on public goods. We focus on one
question in which individuals are asked about whether government should raise or decrease
taxes and spending. The exact wording of the question (ditxssp) is the following:
Many social benets and services are paid for by taxes. If the government had to choose
between increasing taxes and spending more on social benets and services, or decreasing
taxes and spending less on social benets and services, which should they do?
Individuals have to choose a number between 0 and 10, where 0 means that government
should decrease taxes a great deal and spend much less on social benets and 10 means
government should increase taxes a great deal and spend much more on social benets and
services. If we consider that those who choose a value below 5 want to reduce spending,
those who choose 5 want to keep it constant, and those who choose a value above 5 want
to increase spending, we nd that 29.1% want to reduce spending, 38.3% prefer to keep it
constant, while 32.5% want to raise it. Alternatively, we can collapse all the information
again into a dummy variable, called prospending, that takes value 1 when ditxssp takes
value 6 or higher. The mean of prospending is .325 (standard deviation is .468). We nd
that countries are more homogeneous in attitudes toward expenditure than they are toward
immigration. The maximum value of prospending is in Cyprus (.53) and the minimum in
Hungary (.15).
29We could have used the variable hinctnta, which corresponds to household income. However, there is a
large number of missing values in that variable (11,323 out of 46,870, a 24%). Instead, we decided to use
lowincome and borrowconstrained which do not su¤er from the problem of missing values and we believe are
good proxies of the nancial situation in the household.
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We nd that individuals with low education are more willing to support an increase
in spending. However, contrary to the opinions on immigration, we here do not nd a
monotonic relationship between education levels and attitudes toward increasing spending.
As Figure 3 shows, the middle-educated individuals are less favorable to increasing spending
than the other groups. This result is not in line with the prediction of our theoretical model.
However, at this point we have not controlled for a number of observable characteristics.
5.1.3 Interest in Politics
We have also information about interest in politics. We want to use this information, be-
cause not all individuals are equally likely to show up at the election polls. There are two
possible sources of information. First, in one question (variable polintr) individuals report
how interested in politics are. Possible answers are: very interested (1), quite interested (2),
hardly interested (3), and not at all interested (4). Relative frequencies are 11.01%, 38.07%,
32.88%, and 18.04%. We collapse this information into a dummy variable called polint that
takes value 1 when polintr is either 1 or 2. Second, individuals are asked whether they voted
or not in the last national election (variable vote). A 76.33% went to vote, a 20.37% did not
and a 3.30% were not eligible to vote.
5.2 Model Specication
The key implication of our theoretical model is that, as the weight of the high-skilled in-
creases, the equilibrium outcome has lower tax-expenditure policies and a higher immigration
quota. As a result, middle and low-skilled natives should be less tolerant to the arrival of
immigrants and more willing to raise taxes to nance public services. To check these impli-
cations we do as follows.
We compute for each country the fraction of individuals with low, middle and high
education. For instance, the fraction of individuals with high education goes from 8.26% to
64.64%, with a mean value of 37.64%. Next we divide all countries into two groups depending
on whether or not the highly skilled make up a majority among voters. This will be the
case if the group of highly skilled individuals represents a higher fraction than each one of
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the other two groups. In 4 out of 26 countries the highly skilled are a majority, while in
the remaining 22 countries they are not. Combining this with the information on education
levels, we end up dividing our sample into six (disjoint) groups. We illustrate this process
in Table 1 below:
Table 1: Sample divided into six groups
Education level
High-Skilled majority Low Medium High Total
(I) (III) (V)
NO 5,631 (12.0%) 14,690 (31.3%) 7,308 (15.6%) 27,629 (58.9%)
(II) (IV) (VI)
YES 1,849 (3.9%) 6,755 (14.4%) 10,636 (22.7%) 19,241 (41.0%)
Total 7,481 (15.9%) 21,445 (45.7%) 17,944 (38.3%) 46,870 (100%)
Individuals are split into six groups, labeled from Group I to Group VI. According to
Table 1, the most populous group is Group III, corresponding to individuals with a medium
level of education living in countries where the highly skilled are not a majority. Our
approach consists of comparing the opinions on immigration and expenditure by columns.
That is, conditional on having low education, is there a signicant di¤erence in opinions
depending on whether or not the highly skilled are a majority? In other words, we want to
compare the opinions of Group I with those of Group II, of Group III with Group IV, and
of Group V with Group VI. Our model predicts that individuals in Group II should be more
opposed to immigration and more favorable to raising taxes and expenditure, compared to
individuals in Group I. The reason is that those in Group II live in a country where the
majority are highly skilled and the implemented policy should be closer to the bliss point of
this group and, therefore, more distant from the bliss point of the low and middle-skilled.
The same comment applies when we compare Group IV with Group III. Accordingly, we
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should also observe that highly skilled individuals are more favorable to immigration and
more opposed to increases in taxes and expenditure in countries in which they do not make
up a majority (Group V), compared to those living in countries in which they are a majority
(Group VI). Now the reason is that in the former countries the policy implemented should
be close to the bliss point of the low and middle educated individuals.30
A possible approach could be to compute simply the average values of our two dummy
variables of interest (proimm, prospending) for each one of the six groups in Table 1 to
check if our theoretical predictions hold. This is clearly problematic, since country skill
composition is endogenous and may be a¤ected by a number of unobserved characteristics
that are also related to attitudes towards public spending and immigration. That is, people
living in countries where the high skilled are a majority may be in general di¤erent from
those living in low-skilled countries. The ideal experiment should require a variable that
a¤ects country skill composition and that it is not related to unobservable characteristics
and preferences. However, it is di¢ cult to think of such variable. To partially address
this problem, we estimate a bivariate Probit model in which we control for many relevant
observable characteristics and we include a dummy regional variable that aims to capture
unobserved heterogeneity at the level of regions. Then, using the estimated coe¢ cients of
this model, we compute mean values of our two dummy variables for each group in Table 1.
To do this, we rst describe the bivariate model we estimate.
Our two binary outcomes (proimm, prospending) have been already described in the
previous section. The set of regressors includes variables belonging to four di¤erent channels
through which attitudes toward immigrants are driven. Namely, (i) non-economic channel,
(ii) labor-market channel, (iii) welfare-state channel, and (iv) political-process channel.
(i) Non-economic channel : We include a number of individual characteristics as age, gender,
religion, etc. among our regressors. Appendix 3 provides details of all the variables we use.
Table 2 sets out the summary statistics for all of them. These individual characteristics are
30We could have done the analysis at the regional level, since we have information on the region of residence
at the NUTS-I level. However, we prefer to do the analysis at the country level because the voting jurisdiction
is the country in most cases.
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included in our two equations.
Table 2
(ii) The labor market channel includes years of education (eduyrs), and a dummy variable
(unempl) that equals 1 if the individual is unemployed.
(iii) Concerning the welfare state channel we use data on income (lowincome and borrowcon-
strained). We also control for individual attitudes toward distributional issues: progov (the
respondent agrees that governments should reduce income di¤erences) and socbenpoverty
(the respondent agrees that social services reduce poverty) and for individual attitudes to-
ward political institutions: trust parliament (the respondent trusts the parliament) and
health e¢ cient (the respondent agrees that the provision of health care is e¢ cient).
(iv) Political-process channel : Since we have six groups, we need ve dummy variables to
compare opinions on immigration and public spending among them. We take Group I (see
Table 1 above) as the reference group and we add ve dummy variables to our model. The
rst two dummy variables are Mideduc and Higheduc and correspond to individuals with
medium and higher education, respectively. The third variable is called H-majority country,
taking value one for those countries where the highly skilled is larger than the other two
groups. Finally, we include two variables that capture the interaction of H-majority country
with Mideduc and Highduc, respectively.
Our theoretical model predicts that the dummy variable H-majority country will have
a negative sign on our rst outcome (attitude to immigration), and a positive sign on our
second outcome (attitude to public spending).
Opinions expressed on social spending and immigration issues can be correlated to un-
derlying values like ideology. Since in the ESS individuals are asked about their ideological
position, we control for these observable characteristics by using partisan (being close to a
particular political party) and lrscale (individuals have to place themselves on a left-right
scale from 0 to 10). It is important to point out that we use partisan and lrscale only as
control variables with no intention to give them a causal interpretation.
Finally, we also include regional dummies in all our regressions to control for regional-
specic factors not captured by the rest of regressors. In particular, they will capture regional
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e¤ects di¤erent from the fact that there is a particular type of majority in the country. To
allow for arbitrary patterns of correlation within countries, in all of our regressions robust
standard errors are clustered at country level.
5.3 Results
Table 3 reports the estimations of a bivariate Probit model corresponding to two alternative
specications. Model 1 includes the dummy variables we have just described. In Model 2 we
present results for an alternative model in which, instead of computing majorities among all
individuals, we compute them among those who went to vote in the last election. In the two
models we reject the null hypothesis that the two outcome variables are independent of each
other. This moves in the direction that preferences regarding immigration and preferences
regarding expenditure are jointly determined. In both models the estimate of rho is 0.1,
and it is signicantly di¤erent from zero. This indicates that unobservable factors that are
positively related to the attitude to immigration are also positively related to the attitude
toward public spending. A plausible explanation for this result could be the voting for
your enemybehavior in Ortega (2010). Some pro-redistribution voters may be willing to
admit unskilled immigrants since they anticipate that these immigrants will support more
redistributive policies in the future, once they become new voters.
Regarding the rst channel, the variables that seem to have a signicant positive e¤ect
on our rst endogenous variable (proimm) are parentbornout, urban, stife, and peoplehelp.
The welfare state channel is captured by the lowincome variable. Individuals who declare
to face di¢ culties on present income (lowincome=1) are more opposed to immigration, and
more favorable to raising expenditure and taxes. The variable eduyrs seems to pick up
the e¤ects of the labor market on proimm, but its e¤ect on prospending is not signicantly
di¤erent from zero. In line with our theoretical model, we nd that the coe¢ cient of H-
majority country is negative and signicant in the rst equation (proimm). This means
that individuals living in countries where the majority are highly skilled are more opposed
to immigration than those who live in countries where a di¤erent group has a majority. In
the second equation (prospending), the coe¢ cient of H-majority country is positive. This is
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again in line with our theoretical prediction. However, its e¤ect is not statistically signicant.
A possible explanation could be that the variable we use does not capture all dimensions of
public spending.31
Table 3
However, what is more interesting is to use the tted bivariate Probit model to calculate
mean values of our two binary outcomes corresponding to each one of the six groups in Table
1. We represent these mean values in Figure 4. Regarding opinions about immigration
the predicted pattern holds for the medium and highly skilled groups and di¤erences are
statistically signicant. Mean values of proimm for these two groups are 41% and 45% when
the majority is highly skilled, compared to 47% and 65%when other groups have more weight.
In contrast, low-skilled individuals seem more favorable to immigration when the highly
skilled are a majority.32 This goes against our theoretical prediction. Regarding opinions
about public expenditure, the predicted pattern holds for the three groups. However, the
di¤erence is not statistically signicant for the high-skilled.33 These results are suggestive of
the modelling predictions.
Figure 4
6 Conclusions
This paper applies a political economy approach to explain how the interplay between im-
migration process, labor-market concerns, and welfare-state considerations jointly determine
the shape of native preferences regarding immigration and tax-expenditure policies. A key
prediction of our theoretical model is that as the rich class becomes more politically in-
uential, the resulting political equilibrium outcome has lower public spending and larger
31To assess whether our variables of interest capture the e¤ect that works through the political process and
that years of education measures labor market skills, we run two separate bivariate Probit models, one for
the subsample of natives in the labor force and another one for those not in the labor force. The estimates
generally conrm that our results work mainly through those individuals who are active in the labor force.
These results are available upon request.
32The p-values of the Wald tests of di¤erences are 0.0002 for the low-skilled, 0.0012 for the medium-skilled,
and below 0.0001 for the high-skilled, respectively.
33The p-values of the Wald tests of di¤erences are 0.0025 for the low-skilled, below 0.0001 for the medium-
skilled, and 0.273 for the high-skilled, respectively.
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immigration quotas. As a consequence, the more inuential the rich group is, the higher
the opposition will be against immigration among low and middle-skilled natives. That is,
we nd more polarization of opinions on immigration in regions in which the rich group
dominates.
To test these implications we use data on 26 countries from the 2008 wave of the European
Social Survey. Departing from the existing literature, we estimate the (economic and non-
economic) drivers of individual preferences regarding immigration policies, taking explicitly
into account the connection between welfare-state preferences and immigration preferences.
We nd that individual skills have a positive inuence on the probability of being more
favorable to immigration, while the welfare-state channel seems to reduce that probability.
Our results show that, in general, welfare state and political process channels seem to have
a higher impact on preferences regarding immigration, compared to labor market channel
and non-economic variables.
Our main point is that the traditional variables that have been used in the literature to
explain the variation in attitudes toward immigration among individuals need to be supple-
mented with details on the type of political majority in the region and in the country. Since
di¤erent majorities yield di¤erent policies, opinions among income groups should reect these
di¤erences in implemented policies.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
Before presenting the proof of Proposition 1, we present the following Lemma that charac-
terizes the optimal choice of  for any group J .
Lemma 1 (Preferences on tax rates): Consider group J: There are three possible cases
depending on the value of  : i) When  is large so that y=P  < wJ ; the optimal tax rate for
group J is J = 0; ii) When  is low so that y=P  > wJ ; the optimal tax rate for group J
lies in the interval [bJ ; 1); iii) If y=P  = wJ ; any value of  in the interval [0;bJ ] is optimal.
Proof: Case (i) is illustrated in Figure A1, top panel. We need to dene an auxiliary
function, U1J which is the indirect utility function assuming that sJ can take both positive
and negative values. If sJ can be negative, then MRS(cJ ; hJ) =  1 since the rst-order
Condition (2) when choosing s always holds with equality. The derivative of U1J with
respect to  is  wJ + @q@ =  wJ + y=P ; which is negative. Then, in Case (i) U1J is always
decreasing in  : Note that the function U0J , in Proposition 1, is the indirect utility function
but assuming that sJ = 0: Because of our assumptions on the original utility function, the
function U0J has an inverted-U shape. It is tangent to U1J exactly when  = bJ ; because
in this case the individual voluntarily chooses sJ = 0: For other values of  ; U0J lies below
U1J . The true indirect utility function coincides with U1J to the left of bJ since sJ > 0
when  < bJ ; and it coincides with U0J to the right of bJ since sJ = 0 when   bJ : It
is represented in bold type in Figure A1. In this case the indirect utility function is always
decreasing in  ; which means that the preferred tax rate is J = 0:
Case (ii) is represented in the bottom panel of Figure A1. The di¤erence with Case (i) is
that now the function U1J is strictly increasing. But then, the tangency between U1J and
U0J happens in the increasing part of U0J . The indirect utility function has a maximum to
the right of bJ : In Figure A1 this maximum is at  = J 2 [bJ ; 1):
Case (iii) is similar to cases (i) and (ii), but now the function U1J is horizontal and it is
tangent to U0J at the point where U0J reaches a maximum. Since this is precisely bJ ; the
indirect utility function is constant on [0;bJ ] and decreasing when  > bJ :
Figure A1
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Proof of Proposition 1 (Ranking of tax rates): The fact that H = 0 is a direct
implication of Lemma 1. To prove the second part, note that both M and L choose an
interior solution for  . In particular, they choose the values that maximize U0M and U0L;
respectively. The rst-order conditions are satised with equality:
@U0M((1  )wM ; q)
@
=  @U0M
@c
wM +
@U0M
@h
@q
@
= 0; (7)
@U0L((1  )wL; q)
@
=  @U0L
@c
wL +
@U0L
@h
@q
@
= 0: (8)
These two equations can be written as:
@U0M=@c
@U0M=@h
wM =
@q
@
; (9)
@U0L=@c
@U0L=@h
wL =
@q
@
: (10)
The term on the left represents the marginal cost of the tax rate, while the term on the
right represents the marginal benet. The marginal benet does not depend on  ; while the
marginal cost is increasing in  : Now notice that the marginal cost is exactly the slope of
the function U0J in the space (q; ): Then, SRI condition implies that the marginal cost for
type M is below the marginal cost of type L, then we have that M > L.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Preferences on immigration policy): Since both wL and wM
are less than y=P ; we have that at their optimal choices of  ; sM = sL = 0: First-order
conditions for  are:
MRS(cJ ; hJ) =  @q
@
=wJ(I); (11)
for J = L;M;H:First-order conditions for I can be written for groups M and L as:
 MRS(cM ; hM)(1  )@wM
@I
+
@q
@I
S 0; (12)
 MRS(cL; hL)(1  )@wL
@I
+
@q
@I
S 0: (13)
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Substituting from the above rst-order conditions for  :
@wM
@I
wM(I)
(1  )@q
@
+
@q
@I
S 0; (14)
@wL
@I
wL(I)
(1  )@q
@
+
@q
@I
S 0: (15)
Our technology choice implies wM = bwL and, therefore, @wM@I = b
@wL
@I
: But then, the rst-
order condition for both groups (M and L) is the same which implies IL = IM :
To prove that IM < IH we simply compare the rst-order conditions of groups M and
H. The condition for group M is Equation (12) above. The one of group H is:
 MRS(cH ; hH)(1  )@wH
@I
+
@q
@I
S 0: (16)
The di¤erence is that in Equation (16) the term on the left is positive, since @wH
@I
> 0: This
guarantees that group H will maximize utility at a value of I to the right of IM : When
congestion is low and  < I
P
NL+I
; we have @q
@I
> 0 and group H will want to have IH = I:
When   I PNL+I ;
@q
@I
< 0 and IL = IM = 0:
Proof of Proposition 3 (Political equilibrium): We use Expression 6 to compute Can-
didate As probability of winning, which is equal to
A(eA; eB) = Prob[
X
J
JZ
  1
2J
di;J  1
2
]
=
1
2
+
'

[
X
J
NJ
J
N
(WJ(eA) WJ(eB))]; (17)
where  =
P
J
NJ
J
N
is the average density across groups. Candidate Bs probability of
winning is, therefore, equal to 1  A. Note that A is continuous in eA.
Because both candidates face the same optimization problem, we focus on Candidate
A. She chooses a policy platform eA so as to maximize A(eA; eB) taken platform eB as
given. From Expression (17) we see that Candidate A is, in fact, maximizing a weighted
social welfare function. This optimization problem has one interior solution and eight corner
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solutions. As the key implication of our theoretical model (Section 4.3) does not depend
on the nature of the solution, we restrict our attention to the interior solution, and the
rst-order conditions are:
@L
@
=
'

X
J
NJ
J
N
J() = 0: (18)
@L
@I
=
'

X
J
NJ
J
N
J(I) = 0: (19)
Since A is continuous and the parameter space is a compact set, there is a policy plat-
form ( ; I) that solves the equation system (18)-(19); and it balances the opposite e¤ects
(weighted by group relative size and group sensitiveness to policy issues) that work through
the labor market and the welfare system.
From Proposition 1 we have that H = 0 < L < M < 1. As a result,  ? 2 [H ; M ],
since it will never be optimal to choose an income tax rate above M ; a similar reasoning
applies to I?:
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider rst the interior solution case. Equations (18) and (19)
determine  and I as functions of the parameters H , M ; and L. Let HM be the Hessian
matrix and jHM j its determinant. We di¤erentiate equations (18) and (19) to obtain the
e¤ect that a change in H has on our policy instruments:
@
@H
=
1
jHM j
NH
N

 H()
@2A
@I2
+ H(I)
@2A
@I@

: (20)
@I
@H
=
1
jHM j
NH
N

 H(I)
@2A
@ 2
+ H()
@2A
@I@

: (21)
Note that jHM j is positive from the second-order conditions. Since 0 = H     M and
IM  I  IH we have H()  0 and H(I)  0, implying that @@H  0 and @I@H  0.
If the parameters of the model are such that we have a corner solution in which either
  or I is not at a corner, then an increase in H may only a¤ect the optimal value of
the variable whose restriction is not binding. It is also possible, however, that changes in
H move the optimal solution away from the corner. For instance, consider the case where
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  2 (0; 1) and I = 0. An increase in H makes the highly skilled more protable in terms
of votes and, hence, candidates tilt their policy announcement toward the bliss point of the
highly skilled group. This means that   decreases and I becomes strictly positive. Now,
consider the case where the parameters of the model are such that the equilibrium policy
is (0; I). Under this scenario, a rise in H may only a¤ect the optimal value of I since
there is no room to change the value of  . An analogous argument applies to other corner
solutions.
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Appendix 2: Deciding the skill mix of immigrants
Here we study the case in which the quota of immigrants I is given, but natives have
to choose the skill mix of this immigrants ow. In particular, they have to choose the
fraction  of immigrants that are low-skilled, while (1  ) is the percentage of high-skilled
immigrants.34 Now total population P = N + I is xed. Labor supplies of the three factors
are LH = NH+(1 )I, LM = NM , and LL = NL+I; respectively. Our technology implies
that an increase in  raises the wage of the high-skilled, while it reduces the wages of both
medium- and low-skilled workers. The e¤ect of  on total output is:
@y
@
=
I
P
(X
J
(
@wJ
@LL
  @wJ
@LH
)LJ + (wL   wH)
)
: (22)
There are two opposite e¤ects at work. On the one hand, there is a redistribution e¤ect
(whose sign is ambiguous) which favors high-skilled workers at the expense of low- and
medium-skilled workers. This e¤ect is captured by the rst term. On the other hand, the
term (wL wH) measures the fall in the output due to the substitution between high-skilled
immigrants and low-skilled immigrants. The sign of this expression is ambiguous, although
we should expect it to be negative, since most countries seem to be interested in attracting
high-skilled immigrants.
The e¤ect of  on the quality of public services, q, will depend on the sign of the above
derivative. If @y
@
< 0; then @q
@
< 0 as well. Individual decisions on s are the same as in the
Section 3. Regarding individual preferences on policy instruments, we can obtain similar
results to those in Section 4. In particular, we have that assuming wM <
y
P 
< wH and SRI,
we get H = 0 < L < M < 1; and 0  L = M < H  1. The analysis of the political
equilibrium outcome does not change. Recall that the resulting political equilibrium policy
( ?; ?) is closer to the bliss point of that group with the highest number of swing voters.
To simplify the comparative static analysis we consider the case in which the parameter
space is such that ( ?; ?) is an interior solution. Then, we can prove a result similar to
Proposition 4. In particular, we denote by  the cross-derivative of the objective function
34To have a tractable model we do not allow for medium-skilled immigrants, reducing the problem to just
one dimension.
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with respect to  and : If  is non-positive and wM <
y
P 
< wH ; an increase in 
H ,
ceteris paribus, decreases  and increases  at the equilibrium. Clearly, since in the new
equilibrium there will be relatively more low-skilled immigrants, we should observe that low-
and medium-skilled natives are less tolerant to the arrival of this type of foreign workers.
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Appendix 3: Description of variables in the text
We describe all the variables used in our estimations (names in bold type). We exclude those
already discussed in the text. All variables in italics are from ESS, 2008 wave.35
 Believe people is helpful (peoplehelp): dummy variable that is 1 when pplhlp is above
5. Variable pplhlp is the answer to Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking
out for themselves.Answers go from 0 (Most mostly look out for themselves) to 10
(People mostly try to be helpful).
 Parent born out (parentbornout): dummy variable that is 1 when either the father
(facntr is 2) or the mother (mocntr is 2) was not born in the country.
 Born out of country (bornout): dummy variable that equals 1 when the individual
was not born in the country (brncntr is 2).
 Urban area (urban): dummy variable that equals 1 when the individual lives in a big
city (domicil is 1) or in the suburbs or outskirts of a big city (domicil is 2).
 Government should reduce income di¤erences (progov): dummy variable that equals
1 when gincdif is 1 or 2. Variable gincdif is the answer to Government should reduce
di¤erences in income levels.Possible answers are 1 (Agree strongly), 2 (Agree),
3 (Neither agree nor disagree), 4 (Disagree), and 5 (Disagree strongly).
 Social services reduce poverty (socbenpoverty): dummy variable that equals 1 when
sbprvpv is 1 or 2. Variable sbprvpv is the answer to Social benets/services pre-
vent widespread poverty.Possible answers are 1 (Agree strongly), 2 (Agree), 3
(Neither agree nor disagree), 4 (Disagree), and 5 (Disagree strongly).
 Trust in parliament (trustparliament): dummy variable that equals 1 when trstprl
is above 4. Variable trstprl is the answer to Trust in countrys parliament.Possible
answers go from 0 (No trust at all) to 10 (Complete trust).
35For more details, go to:
http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round4/
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 Provision of health care e¢ cient (healthe¢ cient): dummy variable that equals 1
when hlthcef is above 5. Variable hlthcef is the answer to Provision of health care,
how e¢ cient.Possible answers go from 0 (Extremely ine¢ cient) to 10 (Extremely
e¢ cient).
 Unemployed last 3 months (unempl): dummy variable that equals 1 when uemp3 is
1. Variable uemp3 is 1 when the individual has been ever unemployed and seeking for
a work for a period of more than three months.
 Ideological position (lrscale): categorical variable that reects placement on left to
right scale. Possible categories go from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right).
 Close to a party (partisan): dummy variable that equals 1 when clsprty is 1. Variable
clsprty is 1 when the individual declares that she feels closer to a particular political
party.
 Life satisfaction (stife): categorical variable that reects the answer to How satised
with life as a whole. Possible categories go from 0 (Extremely dissatised) to 10
(Extremely satised).
 Good health (healthy): dummy variable that equals 1 when health is 1 or 2. Variable
health is the answer to Subjective general health. Possible answers are 1 (Very
good), 2 (Good), 3 (Fair), 4 (Bad), and 5 (Very bad).
 Elementary occupation (manualworker): dummy variable that equals 1 when iscoco
is greater or equal than 9,000. Variable iscoco is a 4-digit coding of occupations.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Pro-immigration attitude 0.441 (0.497) 0 1 44835
Pro-spending attitude 5.100 (2.148) 0 10 42488
prospending 0.325 (0.468) 0 1 42488
Age 46.795 (17.62) 18 99 46870
Age squared 2500.199 (1754.395) 324 9801 46870
Female 0.541 (0.498) 0 1 46853
Religious 0.619 (0.486) 0 1 46614
Born out of country 0.057 (0.232) 0 1 46822
Parent born out 0.122 (0.328) 0 1 46616
Urban area 0.376 (0.484) 0 1 46677
Life satisfaction 6.203 (2.53) 0 10 46478
Good health 0.562 (0.496) 0 1 46815
Believe people is helpful 0.317 (0.465) 0 1 46617
Household income 5.267 (2.735) 1 10 35547
Low income 0.364 (0.481) 0 1 46511
Problems to borrow 0.514 (0.5) 0 1 44668
Gvt should reduce income di¤erences 0.72 (0.449) 0 1 46079
Trust in parliament 0.502 (0.5) 0 1 45756
Social services reduce poverty 0.522 (0.5) 0 1 45371
Provision of health care e¢ cient 0.429 (0.495) 0 1 45987
Education (years) 12.07 (4.238) 0 48 46482
Unemployed last 3 months 0.264 (0.441) 0 1 46567
Elementary occupation 0.107 (0.309) 0 1 41283
Low education 0.16 (0.366) 0 1 46870
Middle education 0.458 (0.498) 0 1 46870
High education 0.383 (0.486) 0 1 46870
Interest in politics 0.491 (0.5) 0 1 46741
Vote last election 0.763 (0.425) 0 1 46436
High-skilled majority 0.411 (0.492) 0 1 46870
High-skilled majority among voters 0.418 (0.493) 0 1 46870
High-skilled majority among interested in politics 0.497 (0.5) 0 1 46870
Close to a party 0.514 (0.5) 0 1 45750
Ideological position 5.103 (2.173) 0 10 40204
39
40 

TABLES AND FIGURES 

Table 3: Bivariate Probit Estimations 
      
  Model 1   Model 2 
VARIABLES Proimm Prospending  Proimm Prospending 
Non-Economic Channel           
Age 0.00508 0.00378  0.00507 0.00379 
 (0.00496) (0.00552)  (0.00496) (0.00553) 
Age squared -0.0001** -0.0000  -0.0001** -0.0000 
 (0.00005) (0.00005)  (0.00005) (0.00005) 
Female -0.00217 0.0115  -0.00241 0.0115 
 (0.0316) (0.0277)  (0.0314) (0.0277) 
Religious -0.0358 -0.0182  -0.0359 -0.0183 
 (0.0295) (0.0353)  (0.0295) (0.0353) 
Born out of country 0.122 -0.00988  0.121 -0.00989 
 (0.0794) (0.0743)  (0.0794) (0.0743) 
Parent born out 0.156** -0.0319  0.155** -0.0318 
 (0.0790) (0.0618)  (0.0792) (0.0618) 
Urban area 0.0791*** 0.0364*  0.0794*** 0.0365* 
 (0.0230) (0.0196)  (0.0231) (0.0196) 
Life satisfaction 0.0244** 0.0134***  0.0244** 0.0134*** 
 (0.0116) (0.00333)  (0.0116) (0.00333) 
Good health 0.0246 -0.0225  0.0249 -0.0224 
 (0.0358) (0.0197)  (0.0359) (0.0197) 
Believe people is helpful 0.206*** 0.126***  0.206*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0326)  (0.0367) (0.0326) 
Welfare State Channel      
Low income -0.0785*** 0.0690**  -0.0780*** 0.0690** 
 (0.0278) (0.0284)  (0.0278) (0.0284) 
Problems to borrow -0.0321** 0.00763  -0.0319** 0.00770 
 (0.0127) (0.0304)  (0.0128) (0.0304) 
Gvt should reduce income differences  0.228***  
 
0.228*** 
 
 
(0.0328)  
 
(0.0328) 
Trust in parliament  0.127***  
 
0.127*** 
 
 
(0.0336)  
 
(0.0336) 
Social services reduce poverty  0.107***  
 
0.107*** 
 
 
(0.0316)  
 
(0.0316) 
Provision of health care efficient  0.211***  
 
0.211*** 
 
 
(0.0259)  
 
(0.0260) 
Labor Market Channel      
Education (years) 0.0254*** 0.00303  0.0838 -0.0304 
 (0.00740) (0.00497)  (0.0735) (0.0647) 
Unemployed last 3 months 0.0208 0.00423  0.336*** 0.0854 
 (0.0391) (0.0402)  (0.124) (0.0888) 
Political Process Channel      
Middle education 0.0812 -0.0294  0.132*** 0.109*** 
 (0.0738) (0.0648)  (0.0437) (0.0228) 
41 

High education 0.338*** 0.0846  -0.0628*** -0.0417** 
 (0.123) (0.0884)  (0.0175) (0.0192) 
H-majority country -0.431*** 0.132  -0.428*** 0.131 
 (0.0800) (0.121)  (0.0817) (0.121) 
H-majority country*Middle education 0.0168 -0.0930  -0.00236 -0.0900 
 (0.0694) (0.0838)  (0.0704) (0.0841) 
H-majority country*High education -0.240* -0.161  -0.238* -0.161 
 (0.127) (0.123)  (0.129) (0.122) 
Close to a party 0.132*** 0.109***  0.112** 0.102*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0228)  (0.0524) (0.0281) 
Ideological position -0.0629*** -0.0417**  -0.0625*** -0.0391** 
 (0.0175) (0.0192)  (0.0183) (0.0199) 
 
     
            
Observations 33,036 33,036  33,036 33,036 
Rho 0.100***  
 
0.1000***  
  (0.0280)     (0.0280)   
 
     
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The model includes regional dummy variables at NUTS-1 level (not reported here). Errors are 
clustered at the country level. 
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Figure 1: Individual private choices 
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Figure 2: Pro-immigration attitude by country
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Figure 3: Attitude towards immigration and public expenditure
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Figure 4: Proimm and Prospending by country type
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Figure A1: Illustration of Lemma 1 
